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The u .s . chemical sector produces more than 70,000 chemicals thai are essential material inputs to critical infrastructure systems, 
such as the energy, public heaHh, and food and agricuHure sectors. Disruptions to the chemical sector can potentially cascade to 
other dependent sectors, resutting in serious national consequences. To address this concern, the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) tasked Sandia National Laboratories to develop a predictive consequence modeling and simulation capabil~y for 
global chemical supply chains. This paper describes that capabil~y , which includes a dynamic supply chain simulation platform 
called N_ABLE TOd. The paper also presents results from a case study that simulates the consequences of a Gulf Coast hurricane on 
selected segments of the U.S. chemical sector. The case study identified consequences that include impacted chemical facil~ies, 
cascading impacts to other parts of the chemical sector. and estimates of the lengths of chemical shortages and reco~ery . O~erall. 
these simulation results can OHS prepare for and respond to actual disruptions. 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) [1J has identified that "protecting and 
ensuring the continuity of the critical 
infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) of 
the United States is essential to the Nation's 
security , public health and safety, economic 
vitality, and way of life." The chemical sector 
serves as one of the 18 CIKR sectors 
identified by DHS. 
Analysis of chemical supply chains within 
this context is an inherently complex task, 
given the dependence of these supply 
chains on multiple CIKR systems (e.g., 
transportation, energy). This effort requires 
data and information at various levels of 
resolution , ranging from network-level 
supply chain systems to individual chemical 
reactions. 
DHS has tasked the National Infrastructure 
Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC) 
with development of a chemical 
infrastructure analytical capability to assess 
interdependencies and complexities of the 
nation's critical infrastructure, including the 
chemical sector. The Federal Government 
established NISAC, which includes 
personnel at Sandia National Laboratories 
(Sandia) and Los Alamos National 
Laboratory to support efforts aimed at 
identification of dependencies within and 
across sectors, providing consequence 
assessment to enable National Risk 
Analysis. 
To address this need, DHS's Science and 
Technology Directorate has funded the 
Sandia component of NISAC in an ongoing 
effort to integrate its existing simulation and 
infrastructure analysis capabilities with 
various chemical industry datasets. The 
intent of this effort is to develop and 
ultimately provide capabi lities in 
consequence and resilience analysiS of 
natural and manmade events that impact 
the chemical industry and chemical-
dependent sectors of the economy. 
This document describes key elements of 
this ongoing development effort, including 
the modeling and simulation tools uti lized in 
analyzing the chemicals sector from 
different perspectives. This includes a case 
study, examining the effects of a Gulf Coast 
hurricane on segments of the chemicals 
sector and an examination of consequence 
and resilience metrics. 
2.0 BODY 
Consequence and resilience analysis of the 
chemicals sector requires a wide range of 
modeling techniques to answer questions of 
varying scopes, acting on a common data 
set. To do this , Sandia developed and 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20110012079 2019-08-29T18:32:15+00:00Z
 510 
 
populated a common data model, a set of 
modeling capabili ties with different 
resolutions, and a framework for analyzing 
resilience. 
2.1 Chemical Data Model (COM) 
Central to the development effort aimed at 
providing consequence and resilience 
analysis is a common Chemical Data Model 
(COM). The COM draws on infrastructure, 
population, labor, economic and other data 
sets from a variety of commercial (e.g., SRI 
Consulting, PennWell , Minnesota IMPLAN 
Group) and government (e.g. , U.S. Bureau 
of the Census, National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, and Surface 
Transportation Board) data sources, as well 
as on data developed during the project. 
COM data are updated annually, at 
minimum, or as often as updates become 
available. 
Figure 1 represents a simplified schematic 
of how the information within COM is 
organized, merged, and stored. Each 
chemical plant in the database has 
attributes that identify where it is located, 
what chemicals are produced and stored, 
the associated capacities for production and 
storage, and what production technologies 
are used at the plant. 
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Figure 1. The Chemica l Data Model. 
2.2 Consequence Analysis Tools 
A variety of Sandia-developed tools 
leverage this common data structure for 
various aspects of analysis of the chemicals 
seclor (and other sectors as appropriate to 
the question). 
2.2.1 FASTMap 
Geospatial analysis is conducted using a 
tool called FASTMap. FASTMap is a 
geographic information system (GIS)-based 
tool that creates common look-and-feel , 
production-quality maps of the chemicals 
sector and other CIKR sectors relative to 
disruption areas, and provides data on 
CIKR assets (e.g., names, number of 
facil ities) in the disruption area. 
2.2.2 Fast Analysis Infrastructure 
Tool (FAIT! 
Infrastructure dependency analysis is 
conducted within a tool called the Fast 
Analysis Infrastructure Tool (FAIT). FAIT 
provides data on the dependencies of 
specific chemical seclor components (e.g., 
plants and pipelines) on assets in other 
infrastructure (e.g., electric power, 
transportation, emergency services). 
2.2.3 Loki 
Network analysis is conducted using a tool 
called Loki , which is a network model and 
analysis tool designed to quickly estimate 
potential production losses among chemical 
manufacturing processes. 
2.2.4 Railroad-Network Analysis 
System (R-NAS) 
Rail transportation analysis is accomplished 
through a network tool called the Railroad-
Network Analysis System (R-NAS). R-NAS 
models the U. S. national rail network and 
estimates the impact to national rail 
commodity flows given disruptions to the rail 
system (bridges, rail yards, and so forth). 
2.2.5 NISAC Agent-Based 
Laboratory for Economics (N-
ABLE"' ) 
Dynamic supply chain analysis is conducted 
using the NISAC Agent-Based Laboratory 
for Economics™ (N-ABLETM) , a large-scale 
microeconomic supply chain model and toot 
that allows for the analysis of the impacts to 
individual firms (production, sales, 
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transportation, and inventories) and the 
broader supply chain over time (output, 
shipments, and inventories) resulting from 
disruptions to firms and transportation 
networks (2J. (3]. N-ABLE'" draws on the 
results of the other analysis tools and 
subject matter expertise to define disruption 
parameters and simulate individual firm 
behaviors within the modeled supply chains. 
Figure 2 shows a representation of the 
interaction of a typical N-ABLE TM enterprise 
firm, containing different types of decision 
makers with objectives, interaction with 
each other, with supporting CIKR, and with 
upstream and downstream 'markets' for 
input commodities and output products. 
Entire supply chains are constructed from 
collections of firms, based on this enterprise 
design, with each participating firm 
interacting with others through markets and 
physical infrastructure. 
Figure 2. N-ABLP'" Enterprise Model of an 
Economic Finn. 
N-ABLETM simulation results provide 
quantitative and qualitative information 
necessary for consequence analyses. For 
example, if a hurricane temporarily shuts 
down a set of chemical production facilities, 
N-ABLE TM estimates economic impacts 
resulting from a decreased chemical supply 
to downstream facili ties (e.g., customers of 
the dosed facilities, the customers of the 
customers, etc.). N-ABLETM also estimates 
losses resulting from a decreased demand 
of input chemicals used by the closed 
production plants to upstream facilities (e.g. , 
suppliers to the closed plants, suppliers of 
the suppliers, etc.). These economic impact 
and loss estimates can be used to measure 
the systemic impacts to the chemical supply 
chain from a hurricane. 
In addition, N-ABLETM estimates the time 
necessary for the system to recover from a 
disruption. In the case of chemical supply 
chains, supply interruptions can cascade 
through many other sectors at different 
rates. Some downstream consumers will 
feel the impact of interrupted production 
immediately, some will not feel the impact 
until days or weeks later, and some will not 
feel it at all. Inherent in N-ABLE ™ is the 
capability to represent the search for other 
supply sources when losses occur and any 
changes in transportation costs associated 
with the need to use altemate suppliers. 
The cost estimates associated with the 
recovery and adaptation processes are 
crucial to estimating supply chain recovery 
processes. 
2.3 Resilience Analysis Framework 
A uniform, methodical approach for 
assessing resilience of infrastructure 
systems is requ ired to successfully 
incorporate resilience into critical 
infrastructure protection (CIP) policies and 
business planning practices. This approach 
needs to be general enough to apply to all 
types of infrastructure systems to account 
for dependencies between different 
infrastructure types and establish standards 
across all infrastructure types. Furthermore, 
resilience assessment approaches should 
explicitly account for the costs of recovery 
processes in comprehensive disruption cost 
evaluations. 
With these two requirements in mind, 
Sandia has developed a novel framework 
for evaluating the resilience of infrastructure 
and economic systems [4]. The framework 
includes a new definition of reSilience, a 
mathematical resil ience cost measurement 
approach, and a qualitative analysis 
methodology that assesses system 
characteristics that affect resi lience. This 
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framework can be applied to studies of 
natural and manmade disruptions. 
The framework as developed presents a 
mathematical resi lience cost measurement 
approach that can be used to objectively 
determine the impacts of disruptions on a 
system and the resilience costs associated 
with disruptions. The resilience cost 
measurement approach requires 
quantification of two key components of the 
definition of system resilience: systemic 
impact (Sf) and total recovery effort (TRE) . 
S/ is the impact that a disruption has on 
system productivity and is measured by 
evaluating the difference between a 
targeted system performance (TSP) level 
and the actual system performance (SP) 
following the disruption. TRE refers to the 
efficiency with which the system recovers 
from a disruption and is measured by 
analyzing the amount of resources 
expended during the recovery process. The 
measurement of system resilience costs 
requires the quantification of both $/ and 
TRE. 
Figure 3 graphically represents systemic 
impact for a hypothetical system that has 
been disrupted. In this example, system 
performance decreases immediately 
following the disruption shock. Vv'ith the 
onset of recovery actions, performance 
levels eventually increase and ultimately 
attain targeted system performance levels. 
At this point, recovery is considered 
complete. Sf is quantified by calculating the 
area between the TSP and the actual SP 
curves in Fig. 3. This area is calculated 
using the formula in Eq. (1) . 
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Figure 3. Systemic Impact (SI). 
51 ~ f,; [TSP(t) - SP(t )] dt Eq. (1) . 
Figure 4 illustrates the recovery response 
for the system shown in Fig. 3. After the 
disruption initiates, the recovery response 
begins and resources are expended in this 
effort. The TRE is the cumulative amount of 
resources expended during the recovery 
period and is represented by the area under 
the recovery effort (RE) curve in Fig. 4. This 
area is calculated by Eq. (2). 
Figure 4. Total Recovery Effort (TRE). 
TRE ~ .i:"[RE(t)]dt 
'" . 
Eq (2) 
System performance is determined by the 
RE. That is, different REs lead to different 
sys~em performances. For example, if no 
RE IS made following the disruption, the loss 
of system performance may be great. In 
contrast, if recovery resources are deployed 
shortly after the system shock, system 
performance may not be Significantly 
affected, and Sf may be small. The 
recognition that S/ is implicitly determined 
by the selected recovery strategy leads to 
the development of recovery-dependent 
resilience (RDR) cost measurements. RDR 
costs are the resilience costs of a system 
under a particular recovery strategy and are 
calculated with Eq. (3) . 
RDR(RE) = ~1+(a XTR~) 
ft: ITSP(t )ldt 
Eq. (3) . 
RDR costs are linear combinations of 51 
and TRE. The denominators in Eq. (3) are 
normalization factors that permit the 
comparison of the resilience of systems of 
different magnitudes. Because resilience 
represents a balancing of S/ and TRE costs , 
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the calculation of RDR costs includes the 
parameter a, which is a weighting factor that 
allows an analyst to assign the relative 
importance of the systemic impact and total 
recovery effort terms. Assigning a small 
positive value to a weighs the systemic 
impact more heavily; a large positive value 
for a weighs the cost of recovery more 
heavily. To equally weigh SI and TRE, a is 
set to 1. 
In addition to RDR costs, optimal resilience 
(OR) costs can also be considered, buttheir 
calculation is beyond the scope of this work 
at present. 
When applied to the CDM, N-ABLE'" 
simulations can provide quantitative and 
qualitative information necessary for 
resilience analyses. For example, if a 
hurricane temporarily shuts down a set of 
chemical production facilities , N-ABLETM 
can estimate economic impacts resulting 
from a decreased chemical supply to 
downstream facilities (e.g., customers of the 
closed facilities, the customers of the 
customers, etc.). N-ABLETM can also predict 
losses resulting from decreased demand of 
input chemicals used by the closed 
production plants to upstream facilities (e.g., 
suppliers to the closed plants, suppliers of 
the suppliers, etc.). These economic impact 
and loss estimates can be used to measure 
the SIs to the chemical supply chain from a 
hurricane. 
In addition, N_ABLETM can predict how the 
chemical sector will adapt to and recover 
from a disruption. The tool has the capability 
to estimate production curtailments by the 
customers of the closed plants that cannot 
find new suppliers, the higher transportation 
costs associated with new suppliers, the 
use of chemical substitutes, and the 
implementation of different production 
teChnologies and recipes to adapt to a 
disruption. The cost estimates associated 
with the recovery and adaptation processes 
are crucial to calculating the TRE in a 
resilience analysis. 
3.0 DISCUSSION 
3.1 Analysis Basis 
The methodology, models, data, and other 
capabilities described above have been 
applied to a variety of homeland security 
problems. The following summary of an 
analysis of a Category 3 hurricane making 
landfall in the Gulf Coast is an example of 
this application. 
The scenario hurricane was patterned after 
the actual Hurricane Ike (2008), which 
developed during the early part of 
September and made its landfall over 
coastal Texas on September 13, 2008. The 
storm moved at a projected forward speed 
of 12 miles per hour (mph), carrying 
maximum sustained winds of over 100 mph. 
The storm size was approximately 230 
miles, and it was the third most destructive 
hurricane in U.S. history. Figure 5 shows 
the projected path of Hurricane Ike early on 
September 11 , 2008. 
Figure 5. Projected Path of Hurricane Ike, 
NOAA AdviSOry 41,0400 COT September 11, 
2008. 
Sandia used the scenario storm parameters 
(trajectory and category) in this analysis to 
first estimate the damages from wind and 
surge waters. These damage estimates are 
translated into areas of probable electric 
power outage and inland flooding depths. 
Sandia analysts then assessed potential 
direct impacts to chemical facilities, 
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petroleum refineries , and the natural gas 
network for elements physically affected by 
this scenario storm . Analysts then assessed 
the indirect impacts to facilities and 
infrastructures not in the path of the 
hurricane but dependent on facilities within 
the disruption area. Finally, analysts 
estimated cascading impacts to the 
chemical industry and petrochemical supply 
chain at a regional , national, and global 
level. Figure 6 shows the estimated electric 
power disruption area for the scenario 
hurricane. Differences in color reflect the 
likelihood of power outage (green reflecting 
a 0- to 25-percent probability of outage, red 
representing a 75- to 100-percent 
probability of power outage), while intensity 
of color reflects the projected duration of 
disruption (lighter shades representing 
shorter duration of outage where present, 
darker shades representing longer duration 
of outage where present) . 
Figure 6. Estimated Disruption Area of the 
Scenario Hurricane. 
It is common practice for Gulf Coast 
petrochemical production facilities in the 
projected path of a hurricane to shut down 
operations 48 hours prior to hurricane 
landfall. On average, the petrochemical 
facilities within the electric power outage 
contours will be without power for a few 
weeks. Production at these facilities will not 
likely be restored immediately following 
restoration of power. Following a plant 
shutdown, petrochemical facilities often 
require additional startup time to perform 
system checks, such as purging pipelines 
and vessels with inert gases such as 
nitrogen, to ensure the unit's operability. To 
simulate the cumulative effects of these, 
analysts assumed that all petrochemical 
facilities within the outage contours are shut 
down for 25 days. 
To quantitatively evaluate the resilience of 
the petrochemical supply chain , we ran two 
sets of N-ABLETM simulations. In the 
baseline scenario, we assumed no 
disruptions. In the disruption scenario, we 
assumed that a hurricane is projected to 
make landfall on day 202 of the simulation 
and the electric power outage shown in 
Figure 6 is expected to occur. On day 200, 
all petrochemical facilities within the 
contours shut down in anticipation of the 
storm. Normal production capabilities are 
assumed to return on day 225 of the 
simulation. 
The market value of production (MVP) is the 
metric used to measure SI. MVP captures 
total "street value" of every step of 
chemical-unit production. It is similar to the 
sale value of end products, but it counts 
production at every stage in the production 
process, whereas the sale value only counts 
chemicals that are sold on the merchant 
market. MVP equals sale value of end 
products if there is absolutely no vertical 
integration, I.e. , outputs of every stage of 
the production process are sold on the 
merchant market 
For this analYSiS, two factors are considered 
in determining TRE: additional aggregate 
transportation costs (Te) and production 
plant shutdown/restart costs (RC). VV'hen a 
disruption decreases the supply of available 
chemicals , consumers of those chemicals 
will seek new suppliers. These suppliers will 
likely be farther from the consumers than 
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the original suppl iers , so the cost of 
transporting chemicals from the new 
suppliers will likely be greater due to the 
increased transportation distances 
Cost engineering estimates RCs as a 
percentage of the capital costs of the 
equipment involved. Pre-planned, short-
term shutdowns are generally less 
expensive, based on available data. After 
literature review, consultation with project 
subject matter experts and economists at 
the National Center for Risk and Economic 
Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE) 
and the American Chemistry Council (ACC), 
the authors utilized an RC of 3 percent of 
capital costs. 
For the sake of simplicity, we only consider 
the TCs and RCs when calculating the TRE 
for this example, To calculate RDR costs , 
we set a to 1 in Eq. (3) and approximate the 
integral with 1-day time-step intervals 
because N-ABLETM reports data on a daily 
basis. 
Figure 7 shows MVP as a function of time 
for the base case and the scenario 
hurricane for the whole Ethylene supply 
chain. Utilization of inventories (in hand and 
in transit) helps to buffer some of the effects 
of the disruption. 
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Figure 7. MVP as a function of time, Ethylene 
Supply Chain, Base and Hurricane 
Scenarios. 
Figure 8 shows average shipment distance 
as a function of time for the base case and 
the scenario hurricane for the whole 
Ethylene supply chain. The inventory 
utilization described in Figure 7 comes at a 
cost, which reflects through in the 
calculation of Te, and as a result, on TRE. 
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Figure 8. Average Shipment Distance as a 
Function of Time, Ethylene Supply Chain, 
Base and Hurricane Scenarios. 
Table 1 shows the comparative analysis of 
the calculation of System Resilience for the 
whole Ethylene supply chain and for a 
segment, Vinyl acetate monomer (VAM). 
Impacts to VAM production are more severe 
than the aggregate, transportation distances 
and costs greater, and recovery period 
longer. As such, the VAM resilience metric 
is larger by one-third than that of the 
Ethylene supply chain as a whole (here, a 
lower value reflects a more resilient 
system). 
Table 1. Comparison of Resilience Values, 
Hurricane Scenario, VAM and Ethylene 
Supply Chains 
Measure VAM Ethylene 
Taraet MVP SM) 856 49,000 
SI (SM) 88 4,000 
TRE: RC SM) 11 256 
TRE: TC(SM 1.5 254 
Resilience .12 .09 
Resilience = 51 + (RC + TRE'J lTaraet MVP 
A more detailed discussion of the 
consequence and resilience analysis results 
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for this scenario will be presented at 
MODSIM World 2010. 
4.0 CONCLUSION 
Analysis of chemical supply chains is an 
inherentfy complex task, given the 
dependence of these supply chains on 
multiple infrastructure systems (e.g . 
transportation and energy) . The capabi lity 
developed at Sandia is intended to provide 
information to the DHS with respect to the 
consequences of large-scale disruptions to 
the chemical sector, including interrupted 
supply and resulting economic impacts to 
the nation, which can be utilized to inform 
response and recovery officials , enabling 
more effective pre-event planning and more 
knowledgeable event response. The 
ongoing development effort includes the 
development of several tools along with a 
comprehensive database that feeds the 
tools. The database is constructed by 
merging many datasets in combination to 
provide a high degree of resolution within 
the data so that individual plants can be 
uniquely represented. 
The hurricane disruption scenario presented 
herein shows that large-scale disruptions to 
petrochemical supply chain elements affect 
many supply chains and, consequently, take 
considerable time to recover (Figures 7 and 
8). Supporting this result in the scenario 
analysis , information reported in Chemical 
Week showed that 
Several Texas Gulf Coast chemical 
plants began to restart operations after 
shutting down ahead of Hurricane Ike's 
landfall on September 13, 2008. 
However, producers claim that the 
ready availability of utilities, raw 
materials, and logistics , and the 
damage at some customer sites 
negatively affect their effort to restart 
operations [5]. 
The disruption to chemical plants cascade 
both up and down the supply chain , 
affecting recovery efforts. 
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I'7IMODliM WOILD M ConIoowr<;o ~ ...... 
Dataset Name 
World Petrochemicals Program 2009 
Chemical Economics Handbook 2009 
Directory of Chemical Producers 2009 
Oil & Gas Pipelines 
Oil & Gas Facilities 
United States Census 2000 
County Business Patterns 2007 
County Business Patterns Employees 
Estimation 2007 
Dataset Name 
Geographic Names Information System 
IMPLAN States Summary 2002 
International Trade Statistics 2007 
Refinery Location Data 
2005 Commodity Flow Survey, 
Department of Transportation 
2007 Class I Railroad Statistics, 
Association of American Railroads 
E-Plan Emergency Response 
Information System 
Technical Elements: 
COM 
Provider 
SRI Consulting 
SRI Consulting 
SRI Consulting 
NGA HSIP Gold 2008 (PennWell) 
NGA HSIP Gold 2008 (PennWell) 
U.S. Census Bureau 
U.S. Census Bureau 
U.S. Census Bureau 
Technical Elements: 
COM 
Provider 
U.S. Geological Survey 
Minnesota IMPLAN Group 
U.S. Department of Commerce 
Argonne National Laboratory· 
2005 Waybill Sample, Surface 
Transportation Board 
2007 Producer Price Index, 
Department of Labor 
U,S, Environmental Protection 
Agency/U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security 
• Argonne data were updated uSing 2007 domestic data from the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) and foreign data from SRI Consulting. 
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